Defining Attempts: Mandujano\u27s Error by Fishman, Michael R.
FISHMAN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/2/2015 1:05 PM 
 
Note 
DEFINING ATTEMPTS: MANDUJANO’S ERROR 
MICHAEL R. FISHMAN† 
ABSTRACT 
  The law of attempt requires a court to determine when trying to 
commit a crime is, in itself, conduct that deserves criminal 
punishment. Common-law courts were cautious not to push the 
boundaries of attempt crimes too far, and early definitions of attempt 
required that a defendant come very close to the completion of an 
intended crime before he could be convicted. As Congress has 
codified criminal law, it has created attempt statutes without defining 
attempt, presumably believing that courts would continue to use 
common-law meanings as they had always done. This is exactly what 
happened until the late twentieth century, when federal courts began 
to adopt a new, harsher formulation that had been proposed in the 
American Law Institute’s Model Penal Code (MPC). This Note 
examines the strange process through which federal courts expanded 
the definition of a background principle of criminal law, and argues 
that they were wrong to do so. Judges who ignore such deep common-
law roots usurp the legislature’s role in defining crimes, and create 
confusion as to the true meaning of criminal statutes. 
INTRODUCTION 
Establishing a crime of attempt requires proving two elements: 
the intent to commit a crime and some conduct toward the 
commission of that crime.1 “Much ink has been spilt” by courts, 
lawyers, and scholars seeking to define just how far a defendant’s 
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 1. EUGENE MEEHAN & JOHN H. CURRIE, THE LAW OF CRIMINAL ATTEMPT 3–4 & n.21 
(2d ed. 2000) (“As made abundantly clear in . . . American cases, mens rea and actus reus must 
exist pari passu” to establish a crime of attempt.).  
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conduct can progress before amounting to an attempt.2 The law of 
attempt requires a court to distinguish the conduct of law-abiding 
citizens from conduct deservedly deemed criminal. Common-law 
courts developed a number of ways to resolve this quandary, all of 
which required that a defendant’s conduct come very close to the 
completion of the intended crime.3 After almost 200 years of 
common-law efforts to define the crime of attempt,4 the American 
Law Institute’s 1962 Model Penal Code (MPC)5 included a definition 
of attempt intended to catch would-be wrongdoers earlier in their 
wrongdoing.6 Less than ten years later, federal courts began to adopt 
the MPC’s definition.7 By 1998, every circuit had done so.8 This Note 
examines the unusual process by which a federal court adopted this 
part of the MPC, and argues that federal courts should revise the 
current interpretation of criminal attempts. 
This Note proceeds in three Parts. Part I discusses two possible 
sources of federal attempt law: the common law and the MPC’s 
“Criminal Attempt” provision.9 Part II examines how federal courts 
have developed the definition of attempt, argues that the courts had 
no justification for adopting the MPC’s “substantial step test,” and 
describes how federal courts should have conducted their analyses. 
Part III argues that the erroneous application of the substantial step 
test is a serious error that has created unnecessary confusion and led 
to unjust outcomes. 
 
 2. Mims v. United States, 375 F.2d 135, 148 (5th Cir. 1967); see also Cunningham v. State, 
49 Miss. 685, 701 (Miss. 1874) (“[The] doctrine of attempt to commit a substantive crime is one 
of the most important, and at the same time most intricate, titles of the criminal law. . . . [T]here 
is no title, indeed, less understood by the courts, or more obscure in the text books, than that of 
attempts.”).  
 3. See infra Part I (describing common-law attempt doctrines).  
 4. Kyle S. Brodie, The Obviously Impossible Attempt: A Proposed Revision to the Model 
Penal Code, 15 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 237, 238 (1995) (citing R v. Scofield, (1784) Cald. 397 (K.B.), 
as the first common-law attempt case). 
 5. Past and Present ALI Projects, AM. LAW INST. 5 (Mar. 2015), https://www.ali.org/
media/filer_public/a5/a9/a5a914ef-396a-4b28-96c5-b0dd932176a6/past_present_aliprojects.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/R3ZB-JEJW]. 
 6. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 (1962) (defining “Criminal Attempt”); AM. LAW 
INST., MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES PART I, § 5.01, 331–32 (1985) (discussing the 
justification for expanding attempt liability through section 5.01).  
 7. See United States v. Mandujano, 499 F.2d 370, 377 n.6 (5th Cir. 1974) (adopting the 
MPC’s substantial step test). 
 8. See infra note 111. 
 9. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01.  
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I.  SOURCES OF ATTEMPT LAW 
This Part provides an overview of attempt law in the United 
States. Section A discusses the various common-law attempt 
doctrines that grew out of the initial English creation of attempt as a 
crime. Section B discusses the MPC’s definition of substantial step, 
created by the American Law Institute as a proposed rejection of 
common-law attempt jurisprudence. 
A. Attempt at Common Law 
The common-law crime of “attempt” required both intent to 
commit a crime and an act in furtherance of that intent.10 Courts 
describing the conduct requirement generally distinguished between 
attempts and acts that were merely “preparatory.”11 This distinction, 
by itself, offered little guidance when deciding a particular case.12 
Rather, the attempt/preparation distinction defined the question 
courts were required to answer: Once a defendant decided to commit 
a crime, how much conduct in furtherance of that intent was required 
to convict the defendant of an attempt? Common-law courts 
answered this question using three tests: proximity, probable 
desistance, and res ipsa loquitur.13 
1. Proximity.  Many common-law definitions of attempt 
distinguished between “preparation” and “attempt” by determining 
 
 10. WAYNE LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 622–23 (5th ed. 2010).  
 11. Id. (collecting common-law attempt cases). Although some courts find “preparatory” 
acts to be sufficient, this difference rests on differing views of what conduct is “preparatory,” 
rather than any substantive difference in the scope of attempt law. See id. at 622 (“Precisely 
what kind of act is required is not made very clear by the language traditionally used by courts 
and legislatures. It is commonly stated that more than an act of preparation must 
occur . . . although the situation is confused somewhat because courts occasionally say that 
preparatory acts will be enough under certain circumstances.”).  
 12. United States v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629, 633 (2d Cir. 1950) (“The decisions 
[distinguishing preparation from attempt] are too numerous to cite, and would not help much 
anyway, for there is, and obviously can be, no definite line . . . .”).  
 13. When discussing common-law definitions of attempt, this Note will often refer to state 
court cases interpreting state criminal attempt statutes. Although these are not “common law” 
crimes because they are codified by the legislature, many attempt provisions are so broad as to 
retain all the relevant aspects of common-law offense definition. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW 
§ 110.00 (McKinney 2014) (“A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime when, with 
intent to commit a crime, he engages in conduct which tends to effect the commission of such 
crime.”). This broad formulation has been interpreted to incorporate the state’s common-law 
attempt jurisprudence. E.g., People v. Omwathath, 965 N.Y.S.2d 687, 689 (N.Y. App. Term 
2013).  
FISHMAN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/2/2015  1:05 PM 
348 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 65:345 
how close the defendant came to completing the underlying crime.14 
This test sounded in the belief that criminalizing attempts could help 
deter the harm caused by completed criminal conduct.15 Under almost 
all common-law definitions, a defendant was guilty of an attempt if he 
engaged in the “last proximate act,” that is, if he had done everything 
he believed necessary to commit the predicate crime.16 Although no 
common-law court required there to be a last proximate act,17 
proximity doctrines generally required the defendant’s actions to 
“advance very near to the accomplishment of the intended crime.”18 
Many common-law courts used physical proximity to distinguish 
attempts from preparation. Courts focused on physical proximity 
would ask how close a defendant had come to “the time and place at 
which the intended crime [was] supposed to occur.”19 These analyses 
tended to place the boundary between attempt and preparation fairly 
far along the timeline of a defendant’s activity. For example, in 
People v. Rizzo,20 an influential case decided using a physical 
proximity analysis,21 a man sought to rob a bank messenger carrying a 
“pay roll.”22 Rizzo and his armed accomplices drove to various 
locations where they thought the messenger might be found, but 
could not find him.23 The police observed the behavior of Rizzo and 
 
 14. Other sources describe three distinct “tests” within the common-law proximity 
approaches: the physical proximity test, the dangerous proximity test, and the indispensable 
element test. AM. LAW INST., supra note 6, at 321–29; LAFAVE, supra note 10, at 623–28. For 
the purposes of this Note, there need be no distinction between these tests, because they 
function according to the same general principles. For example, in People v. Rizzo, the case 
cited by both Professor Wayne LaFave and the Commentators as an example of the “physical 
proximity test,” the court explicitly asked if the defendants’ acts came “dangerously near to” the 
commission of the crime. People v. Rizzo, 158 N.E. 888, 889 (N.Y. 1927). It is therefore 
probably more accurate to say that physical proximity, dangerous proximity, and indispensable 
element are simply different considerations within the same test. 
 15. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 62–63 (1881) (stating that the 
purpose of punishing attempts is “to prevent some harm which is foreseen as likely to follow” if 
the defendant were allowed to continue with his plan).  
 16. LAFAVE, supra note 10, at 623–24. 
 17. See AM. LAW INST., supra note 6, at 321 n.97 (stating that no court had ever required 
the last proximate act, and refuting the notion that English courts had ever truly supported this 
requirement).  
 18. Rizzo, 158 N.E. at 889. 
 19. LAFAVE, supra note 10, at 625.  
 20. People v. Rizzo, 158 N.E. 888 (N.Y. 1927). 
 21. Id. The case continues to be cited by New York courts as a source of attempt law. E.g., 
People v. Omwathath, 965 N.Y.S.2d 687, 689 (N.Y. App. Term 2013).  
 22. Rizzo, 158 N.E. at 888. 
 23. Id. at 888–89. 
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his counterparts and arrested the men before they found the 
messenger or came close to anyone in possession of a pay roll.24 The 
New York Court of Appeals reversed the defendants’ convictions, 
holding that they had not come physically close enough to their target 
to commit an attempt, just as a man who “armed himself and started 
out to find the person whom he had planned to kill” would not be 
guilty of attempted murder if he could not find his intended target.25 
In Commonwealth v. Peaslee,26 Oliver Wendell Holmes, then of 
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, employed a “dangerous 
proximity” analysis to distinguish between attempts and preparation.27 
The dangerous proximity test considered a number of factors, 
including the gravity of the attempted offense, the nearness of the 
defendant to completing the crime, and the probability that the 
defendant’s acts would result in the commission of the crime.28 
Relying on an imprecise multifactor test instead of a bright-line rule, 
however, created an unforgiving test for prosecutors. In Peaslee, the 
court held that a defendant’s conduct was insufficient for a conviction 
of attempted arson when the defendant had: (1) created a pile of 
“combustibles . . . in such a way that . . . if lighted would have set fire 
to the building”;29 (2) offered to pay an employee to light the 
combustibles using a candle already placed in the same room; and (3) 
drove that employee some distance toward the building.30 Despite the 
defendant’s extensive and unequivocal conduct, he had not 
completed an attempt because he lacked “a present intent to 
accomplish the crime without much delay,” and did not have “[the] 
intent at a time and place where he was able to” complete the 
planned crime.31 
Courts applying proximity approaches sometimes distinguished 
attempts from preparation by asking whether the defendant had 
gained control of all elements that were “indispensable” to 
 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 889.  
 26. Commonwealth v. Peaslee, 59 N.E. 55 (Mass. 1901) (Holmes, C.J.).  
 27. Id. at 55. Peaslee continues to be controlling law in Massachusetts, and was cited as 
recently as 2009 in Commonwealth v. Bell, 917 N.E.2d 740, 746 (Mass. 2009). 
 28. Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 48 N.E. 770, 771 (Mass. 1897) (Holmes, J.). Peaslee 
referred to Kennedy for the proposition that the proximity test includes the consideration of 
multiple factors to determine the requisite dangerous proximity. Peaslee, 59 N.E. at 56. 
 29. Peaslee, 59 N.E. at 55. 
 30. Id. at 56. 
 31. Id. at 57. 
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commission of the crime.32 Under this approach, if condition X must 
exist before the defendant can commit his intended crime, there can 
be no attempt before condition X exists.33 Justice Holmes referenced 
this rule in Peaslee by holding that the defendant must have intended 
to commit the crime “at a time and place where he was able to carry it 
out.”34 In common-law opinions, the indispensable condition took 
various forms, including the cooperation of a third party,35 the 
possession of contraband,36 or the possession of a weapon.37 
Proximity tests had two important features in common. First, as 
indicated by cases like Peaslee and Rizzo, these tests precluded 
prosecution of attempters who were not very close to achieving their 
criminal goals. Second, all proximity tests asked how far the 
defendant was from completing an intended crime, rather than 
looking to how much the defendant had done in pursuit of a criminal 
intent.38 
2. Probable Desistance.  Under the common-law probable 
desistance test, a defendant’s actions constituted attempts, and not 
mere preparation, if “in the ordinary and natural course of events, 
without interruption from an outside source, [they] would result in 
the crime intended.”39 Courts determined probability of desistance 
through an objective test: whether any person who had gone as far as 
the defendant would likely stop before completing the crime.40 For 
example, in one case using the probable desistance test, the court held 
that a defendant who fashioned “tools adapted to jailbreaking” had 
not yet moved his attempt beyond “abeyance” and therefore could 
not be found guilty of attempted escape from jail.41 Although this test 
was well tailored to punishing only those criminal actors who are truly 
 
 32. See AM. LAW INST., supra note 6, at 323–24 (describing the “Indispensable Element 
Approach”).  
 33. Id. 
 34. Peaslee, 59 N.E. at 57 (emphasis added).  
 35. State v. Block, 62 S.W.2d 428, 431 (Mo. 1933).  
 36. United States v. Stephens, 12 F. 52, 56 (C.C.D. Or. 1882). 
 37. State v. Wood, 103 N.W. 25, 26 (S.D. 1905).  
 38. See United States v. Jackson, 560 F.2d 112, 119 (2d Cir. 1977) (describing “what 
remains to be done” as the “chief concern of the [common-law] proximity tests”).  
 39. AM. LAW INST., supra note 6, at 324 (citing cases which followed the probable 
desistance test).  
 40. Id. at 324–25.  
 41. State v. Hurley, 64 A. 78, 79 (Vt. 1906).  
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dangerous,42 it was entirely impracticable. On what basis can anyone 
know the probability of another’s future actions?43 In practice, courts 
do not seek to read a defendant’s mind.44 Instead, the test functioned 
as a reworded proximity approach, under the theory that a person 
who had come very close to committing a crime would be unlikely to 
turn back.45 
3. Res Ipsa Loquitur.  The res ipsa loquitur test required that a 
defendant’s conduct unambiguously demonstrate criminal intent.46 
Under this test, purchasing a pen with plans to commit forgery, or 
even purchasing a hunting rifle with plans to commit a murder, would 
have been an insufficient act to support an attempt conviction 
because such acts are of an equivocal or “ambiguous nature.”47 As 
was true for all common-law tests, the res ipsa loquitur test excluded 
from attempt liability a wide range of actions taken in pursuit of a 
criminal intent. This was by design, as the test was most concerned 
with the “firmer state of mind” that exists once someone “perform[s] 
acts that he realizes would incriminate him.”48 This test has been 
described as the “stop the film” test,49 because it looked at the 
defendant’s actions as though viewed on a silent film, without the 
defendant’s confession or other statement of intent.50 This test made 
convictions more difficult to obtain because it focused exclusively on 
the defendant’s acts toward commission of the crime.51 A confession 
of intent to commit a crime could not be considered when 
determining whether the defendant’s conduct spoke for itself.52 
 
 42. See AM. LAW INST., supra note 6, at 324–25 (describing the probable desistence test as 
“[o]riented largely toward the dangerousness of the actor’s conduct”).  
 43. See LAFAVE, supra note 10, at 626 (explaining criticisms of the probable desistance 
test).  
 44. See AM. LAW INST., supra note 6, at 325.  
 45. Id. 
 46. See id. at 326–29 (describing the res ipsa loquitur test); LAFAVE, supra note 10, at 626–
28 (same). 
 47. People v. Coleman, 86 N.W.2d 281, 285 (Mich. 1957).  
 48. AM. LAW INST., supra note 6, at 329.  
 49. State v. Stewart, 420 N.W.2d 44, 50 (Wis. 1988). 
 50. J.W. Cecil Turner, Attempts to Commit Crimes, 5 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 230, 237–38 (1933).  
 51. LAFAVE, supra note 10, at 627–28. 
 52. Id. 
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B. The MPC’s Definition of Attempt: Section 5.01 
The MPC, promulgated in 1962 by the American Law Institute,53 
included a general attempt provision in section 5.01, “Criminal 
Attempt.”54 The MPC provided three avenues through which 
prosecutors could establish attempt liability.55 Two overlapped with 
common-law definitions, essentially requiring the defendant to 
perform the last proximate act toward the completion of the predicate 
crime.56 In the third category, the MPC’s definition deviated from the 
common law, requiring that the defendant take only a “substantial 
step” toward the completion of the underlying offense.57 A substantial 
step must be “strongly corroborative of the actor’s criminal 
purpose.”58 Although the definition of substantial step “retain[ed] the 
element of imprecision found in most of the [common-law] 
approaches to the preparation-attempt problem,”59 it provided some 
guidance by listing examples of conduct that, if strongly corroborative 
of criminal purpose, would not be insufficient as a matter of law.60 
The substantial step test’s most significant feature was its 
expansion of attempt liability beyond the common law’s standards.61 
Many of the examples of conduct listed by the MPC as sufficient to 
prove a substantial step include conduct that would have been 
insufficient at common law.62 For example “searching for . . . the 
 
 53. Past and Present ALI Projects, supra note 5. The American Law Institute is an 
“independent organization” devoted to “producing scholarly work to clarify, modernize, and 
improve the law.” About ALI, AM. LAW INST., https://www.ali.org/about-ali [http://perma.cc/
3HTR-EMAW]. 
 54. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 (1962).  
 55. Id. 
 56. See id. § 5.01(1)(a) (encompassing “conduct that would constitute the crime if the 
attendant circumstances were as [the defendant] believes them to be”); id. § 5.01(1)(b) 
(applying only to result crimes, encompassing conduct done “with the purpose of causing or 
with the belief that it will cause [the criminal] result without further conduct on [the 
defendant’s] part”).  
 57. Id. § 5.01(1)(c). 
 58. Id. § 5.01(2). The authors of the Code believed that this would expand the scope of 
attempt law, writing: “It is expected, in the normal case, that this approach will broaden the 
scope of attempt liability [compared to the proximity approaches]. . . . [T]he requirement of 
proving a substantial step generally will prove less of a hurdle for the prosecution than the res 
ipsa loquitur approach . . . .” AM. LAW INST., supra note 6, at 329–30. 
 59. AM. LAW INST., supra note 6, at 329.  
 60. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(2). 
 61. See LAFAVE, supra note 10, at 628 (describing the Model Penal Code’s rejection of 
common-law attempt doctrines). 
 62. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(2) (listing examples). 
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contemplated victim of the crime” would have been conduct sufficient 
to prove an attempt under the substantial step test,63 in contrast to 
common-law cases like Rizzo, in which such conduct would have 
been insufficient as a matter of law.64 The would-be arsonist whose 
actions were held preparatory in Peaslee would also face conviction 
under the Code’s test, which included the “collection . . . of materials 
to be employed in the commission of the crime, at or near the place 
contemplated for its commission, where such . . . collection . . . serves 
no lawful purpose of the actor under the circumstances.”65 Unlike the 
probable desistance test, the substantial step test would apply 
regardless of the probability that a particular defendant would desist; 
unlike the res ipsa loquitur test, it would not require the defendant’s 
actions to unequivocally indicate criminal intent. 
The MPC’s Commentaries acknowledged that the substantial 
step formulation would broaden attempt liability beyond the scope of 
common-law attempt doctrines.66 This broader definition was 
included in the MPC itself to facilitate the “apprehension of [certain] 
dangerous persons” and allow law enforcement to intervene earlier to 
reduce the risk of harm caused by the criminal conduct “without 
providing [the] immunity” from prosecution that the offender would 
enjoy under common-law approaches.67 
II.  THE DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERAL ATTEMPT LAW 
This Part discusses how federal courts have defined the act 
requirement of federal attempt crimes. Section A begins by discussing 
the current consensus, to the extent that one exists, that has formed 
around the MPC’s substantial step test. Section B discusses how the 
courts arrived at this consensus, and the influence of United States v. 
Mandujano68 on the development of federal attempt jurisprudence. 
Section C analyzes Mandujano, arguing that it was wrongly decided 
because it failed to follow traditional methods for interpreting 
statutory language with a common-law background. Section C also 
describes an alternate analysis for cases like Mandujano that would 
 
 63. Id. § 5.01(2)(a). 
 64. People v. Rizzo, 158 N.E. 888, 889–90 (N.Y. 1927).  
 65. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(2)(f). 
 66. See AM. LAW INST., supra note 6, at 329–31 (describing how the substantial step test 
would reach more conduct than the common-law tests). 
 67. Id. at 331.  
 68. United States v. Mandujano, 499 F.2d 370 (5th Cir. 1974). 
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allow courts to arrive at a more defensible definition for federal 
attempts. 
A. The Status of Federal Attempt Law 
Federal criminal law includes no general attempt provision,69 
unlike many state codes,70 the MPC,71 and the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice.72 Liability for attempt to commit a federal crime 
exists only when Congress has explicitly criminalized an attempt.73 
Although the word “attempt” appears many times throughout the 
federal law’s various criminal provisions,74 federal law does not define 
the term.75 
Defining the conduct element of attempt crimes, federal courts 
have “rather uniformly adopted the standard found in [s]ection 5.01 
of the American Law Institute’s MPC.”76 That is, courts have held 
that an attempt requires only a substantial step toward committing 
the substantive crime.77 Most federal appellate courts have included 
the Code’s requirement that a substantial step “strongly 
corroborat[e]” the defendant’s criminal purpose.78 
 
 69. See, e.g., United States v. Anderson, 89 F.3d 1306, 1314 (6th Cir. 1996) (“[T]o attempt a 
federal crime is not, of itself, a federal crime.”); United States v. Berrigan, 482 F.2d 171, 185 (3d 
Cir. 1973) (“Federal criminal law is purely statutory; there is no federal common law of 
crimes.”).  
 70. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 777.04 (2014); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 274, 6 (2014); N.Y. PENAL 
LAW § 110.00 (McKinney 2014); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-12-104 (2014). 
 71. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 (1962). 
 72. Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 80, 10 U.S.C. § 880 (2012). 
 73. United States v. Rivera-Sola, 713 F.2d 866, 869 (1st Cir. 1983) (“[A]ttempt is actionable 
only where a specific criminal statute outlaws both its actual as well as its attempted violation.”). 
 74. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1751(c) (2012) (prohibiting attempts to kill the President of the United 
States or certain other members of the executive branch); 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2012) (containing 
an attempt provision for Hobbs Act robbery and extortion); 18 U.S.C. § 2422 (2012) (containing 
an attempt provision for conduct of certain illegal sexual activity through channels of interstate 
commerce); 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2012) (containing an attempt provision for a number of drug 
crimes). 
 75. United States v. Jackson, 560 F.2d 112, 116 (2d Cir. 1977) (“[T]here is no 
comprehensive statutory definition of attempt in federal law.” (quoting United States v. Heng 
Awkak Roman, 356 F. Supp. 434, 437 (S.D.N.Y. 1973))). 
 76. Rivera-Sola, 713 F.2d at 869; United States v. Joyce, 693 F.2d 838, 842 (8th Cir. 1982). 
For a list of the cases by which circuit courts have adopted this test, see infra note 111. 
 77. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(1)(c) (1962). 
 78. Joyce, 693 F.2d at 841; United States v. Snell, 627 F.2d 186, 188 (9th Cir. 1980); 
Mandujano, 499 F.2d at 376; see also United States v. Monholland, 607 F.2d 1311, 1320 (10th 
Cir. 1979) (quoting Mandujano for its use of the “strongly corroborative” standard, but basing 
its conclusion on the requirement of an “overt act pointed directly to the commission of the 
crime charged”). 
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B. The Development of Federal Attempt Law 
The current interpretation of the conduct required to prove an 
attempt in federal law is derived almost entirely from the Fifth 
Circuit’s decision in United States v. Mandujano. Although a number 
of earlier federal cases addressed the distinction between attempts 
and preparation,79 the present consensus derives directly from 
Mandujano.80 
Roy Mandujano’s conviction for an attempt to distribute heroin 
arose from his interactions with an undercover narcotics officer who 
was pretending to search for drugs to purchase.81 Mandujano asked 
the officer “if he was looking for ‘stuff,’” and the officer said he was.82 
Mandujano indicated that he had access to a certain type of heroin for 
a specific price, if the officer could wait.83 The officer said he could 
not.84 Mandujano said he could procure the heroin immediately from 
a contact if the officer provided money “out front.”85 The officer gave 
the money to Mandujano, who left in an apparent attempt to locate 
the contact.86 After about an hour, Mandujano returned, said he could 
not find the contact, and gave back the officer’s money.87 Mandujano 
said he could procure the heroin if the officer called him an hour and 
a half later.88 The officer left, but when he called Mandujano’s phone 
number at the designated time, someone else answered the phone 
and said that Mandujano was unavailable.89 The officer had no further 
contact with Mandujano before his arrest.90 At trial, a jury found 
 
 79. E.g., United States v. Noreikis, 481 F.2d 1177, 1181 (7th Cir. 1973); Mims v. United 
States, 375 F.2d 135, 148, 149 n.41 (5th Cir. 1967); United States v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629, 633 (2d 
Cir. 1950); Gregg v. United States, 113 F.2d 687, 690 (8th Cir. 1940); Heng Awkak Roman, 356 
F. Supp. at 437, aff’d, 484 F.2d 1271 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Butler, 204 F. Supp. 339, 344 
(S.D.N.Y. 1962); United States v. Robles, 185 F. Supp. 82, 85 (N.D. Cal. 1960); United States v. 
De Bolt, 253 F. 78, 81 (S.D. Ohio 1918).  
 80. See infra notes 101–11 and accompanying text (describing the post-Mandujano 
development of attempt law). 
 81. Mandujano, 499 F.2d at 371. 
 82. Id. at 371. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 371. 
 86. Id. at 371–72. 
 87. Id. at 372. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
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Mandujano guilty of an attempt to distribute heroin in violation of 21 
U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846.91 
On appeal, Mandujano argued that the evidence showed only 
preparation, not an attempt, to distribute heroin.92 The court had to 
determine the scope of the word “attempt” as used in § 846, an 
attempt provision for a variety of drug crimes. The court began its 
analysis by noting “there is no legislative history indicating exactly 
what Congress meant when it used the word ‘attempt’ in section 
846.”93 The court then discussed federal cases that had grappled with 
the limits of attempt.94 Mandujano cited a number of federal cases 
that explicitly relied upon state decisions using common-law tests.95 
The Fifth Circuit, however, made no effort to determine whether it 
should define attempt according to its common-law meaning. Instead, 
the court wrote that “[a]lthough the . . . [federal] cases give somewhat 
varying verbal formulations, careful examination reveals fundamental 
agreement about what conduct will constitute a criminal attempt.”96 
According to the “fundamental agreement,” a defendant has 
committed an attempt if, acting with the mental state required for the 
underlying crime, the defendant takes a “substantial step toward 
commission of the crime.”97 In a footnote, the court acknowledged 
that its “definition is generally consistent with and [its] language is in 
fact close to” the MPC’s definition of attempt.98 Holding that 
Mandujano’s conduct constituted a substantial step toward the 
distribution of heroin, the court affirmed his conviction.99 
After Mandujano, other circuit courts followed the Fifth in 
adopting the MPC’s “substantial step” test, explicitly or implicitly 
relying upon Mandujano’s reasoning. The Seventh Circuit, a year 
after Mandujano, adopted that case’s substantial step test in United 
States v. Green100 with no explanation for why Mandujano’s reasoning 
 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 372–76. 
 95. See id. at 372–76 (citing, inter alia, cases that relied upon the dangerous proximity test, 
including United States v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629, 632–33 (2d Cir. 1950), and Gregg v. United 
States, 113 F.2d 687, 690 (8th Cir. 1940)). 
 96. Id. at 376. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 377 n.66.  
 99. Id. at 379–80. 
 100. United States v. Green, 511 F.2d 1062 (7th Cir. 1975). 
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was persuasive.101 In United States v Stallworth,102 the Second Circuit 
adopted the Fifth Circuit’s standard noting that Mandujano’s rule was 
“properly derived from the writings of many distinguished jurists.”103 
However, in support of that contention, Stallworth cited opinions that 
used common-law approaches to attempt based on proximity rather 
than approaches similar to that of the MPC.104 
Shortly after Stallworth, the Second Circuit solidified its adoption 
of the MPC’s test in United States v. Jackson,105 citing the text of 
section 5.01 in its entirety and extensively quoting to the Code’s 
Commentaries to section 5.01.106 Though Mandujano and Stallworth 
had suggested that the substantial step test was merely “generally 
consistent with” the MPC’s,107 having been “derived from the writings 
of many distinguished jurists” such as Cardozo and Holmes,108 
Jackson acknowledged that Mandujano’s test had been “derived in 
large part from the MPC’s standard.”109 The court did not explain why 
the MPC should be used to define a federal crime. 
In 1979, the Tenth Circuit adopted Mandujano’s test, reasoning 
only that the Fifth Circuit in that case had “summarize[d] virtually all 
of the federal cases on the subject, and although some of them stated 
the requirement of overt act in somewhat different terms, the 
standard in most instances was virtually the same.”110 Over the next 
two decades, every circuit adopted Mandujano’s substantial step test; 
however, none explained why it had adopted the MPC’s definition of 
an attempt beyond a citation to the circuits that had already done 
so.111 
 
 101. See id. at 1072 (laying out the test and concluding that it “was clearly met in this case”). 
 102. United States v. Stallworth, 543 F.2d 1038 (2d Cir. 1976).  
 103. Id. at 1040. 
 104. See id. at 1040 n.4 (“According to [Justice] Cardozo, a suspect’s conduct must ‘carry the 
project forward within dangerous proximity to the criminal end . . . .’” (quoting People v. 
Werblow, 148 N.E. 786, 789 (N.Y. 1925))). 
 105. United States v. Jackson, 560 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1977).  
 106. Id. at 117–20.  
 107. United States v. Mandujano, 499 F.2d 370, 377 n.6 (5th Cir. 1974),  
 108. Stallworth, 543 F.2d at 1040. 
 109. Jackson, 560 F.2d at 120.  
 110. United States v. Monholland, 607 F.2d 1311, 1320 (10th Cir. 1979).  
 111. United States v. Hsu, 155 F.3d 189, 202 n.19 (3d Cir. 1998) (“We adopt the Model Penal 
Code . . . test for attempt because it is consistent with our own caselaw and with the great weight 
of modern precedent.”); United States v. Duran, 96 F.3d 1495, 1508 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (using 
Mandujano’s substantial step test); United States v. McFadden, 739 F.2d 149, 152 (4th Cir. 1984) 
(discussing Mandujano and section 5.01 in detail, and using the substantial step test); United 
States v. Rivera-Sola, 713 F.2d 866, 869 (1st Cir. 1983) (citing every circuit which had adopted 
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C. Criticism of Mandujano and its Progeny 
This line of attempt cases demonstrates that, if Mandujano’s 
holding was incorrect, then the widespread case law defining criminal 
attempts according to the MPC’s substantial step test should be 
reevaluated. 
1. Mandujano’s Analysis.  The cases Mandujano cited were not 
dispositive of the definition of an attempt. Many were district court 
cases, and none were binding upon the Fifth Circuit.112 Further, the 
court’s claim that the cases revealed “fundamental agreement”113 was 
an overstatement. Indeed, the cases cited revealed a fundamental 
disagreement. For example, in support of the conclusion that a 
“substantial step” must be “strongly corroborative of the firmness of 
the defendant’s criminal intent,”114 the court cited federal cases 
covering the full range of possible stances on the corroboration 
question, from a case that required no corroboration115 to one that 
required that the act unequivocally demonstrate criminal purpose.116 
When explaining its use of the phrase “substantial step” as opposed 
to “overt act,”117 the Mandujano court said only that this language was 
meant to separate the conduct of attempt from “remote 
 
the substantial step test); United States v. McDowell, 705 F.2d 426, 427–28 (11th Cir. 1983) 
(citing only Mandujano); United States v. Williams, 704 F.2d 315, 321 (6th Cir. 1983) (quoting 
numerous cases, including Mandujano); United States v. Joyce, 693 F.2d 838, 841 (8th Cir. 1982) 
(citing every circuit which had adopted the substantial step test); United States v. Snell, 627 F.2d 
186, 187–88 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing every circuit which had adopted the substantial step test). 
 112. See Mandujano, 499 F.2d at 372–76 (citing six circuit court cases and six district court 
cases).  
 113. Id. at 376.  
 114. Id.  
 115. Id. (citing United States v. Robles, 184 F. Supp. 82, 85 (N.D. Cal. 1960), for the 
definition of an attempt as requiring the de minimis standard of “[a]ny effort or endeavor to 
effect the act” without any reference to a corroboration requirement). 
 116. See id. at 377 (citing Mims v. United States, 374 F.2d 135, 148 n.40 (5th Cir. 1967), for 
the proposition that mere corroboration is insufficient: “there must be some appreciable 
fragment of the crime . . . the act must not be equivocal in nature”).  
 117. Some of the federal attempt cases cited by Mandujano used the “overt act” 
formulation. Mandujano, 499 F.2d at 372–74 (citing United States v. Noreikis, 481 F.2d 1177, 
1182 (7th Cir. 1973); Lemke v. United States, 211 F.2d 73, 75 (9th Cir. 1954); Wooldridge v. 
United States, 237 F. 775, 778–79 (9th Cir. 1916); United States v. Baker, 129 F. Supp. 684, 685 
(S.D. Cal. 1955); United States v. De Bolt, 253 F. 78, 80 (S.D. Ohio 1918)). By themselves, the 
words “overt act” would seem to indicate that any conduct, even preparation, would be 
sufficient to establish an attempt. However, the cases make clear that an “overt act” must still 
proceed beyond preparation. See, e.g., Wooldridge, 237 F. at 779 (applying the rule that an overt 
act “must be some act directed toward the commission of the offense after the preparations are 
made” (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Taylor, 84 P. 82, 83 (Or. 1906)).  
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preparation.”118 But the cases cited in Mandujano did not agree that 
attempts encompassed everything except remote preparation; the two 
cases Mandujano directly cited for this point relied upon common-law 
proximity analyses.119 
Regardless of the Mandujano court’s reasoning, its holding 
required leaving behind traditional common-law definitions of 
attempt in favor of the MPC’s substantial step test. Mandujano’s 
conduct certainly would have failed to establish an attempt under the 
strict proximity approaches.120 He would not have moved beyond 
preparation under an “indispensable element” analysis because he 
never gained possession of the heroin he was “attempting” to 
distribute.121 The evidence showed that Mandujano searched for, but 
never found, the heroin he was attempting to distribute, mirroring the 
failure of the defendant’s preparatory acts in Rizzo.122 Like the 
defendant in Peaslee, Mandujano never possessed an “intent [to 
distribute the heroin] at a time and place where he was able to carry it 
out.”123 Although the “probable desistance” test may have been 
difficult to apply in a large number of cases,124 this case is not one of 
them. There was no need to ask whether desistance was probable, 
because Mandujano actually gave up his initial attempt to secure the 
heroin, and was unwilling to engage in further conversation with his 
intended customer.125 
It is arguable that Mandujano’s conduct moved beyond 
preparation under a res ipsa loquitur analysis on the theory that the 
act of agreeing to locate and sell the heroin “can have no other 
purpose than”126 distribution of the heroin. Such an analysis misses 
other potential motivations. For example, Mandujano could have 
 
 118. Mandujano, 499 F.2d at 377. 
 119. United States v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629, 633 (2d Cir. 1950) (quoting Commonwealth v. 
Peaslee, 59 N.E. 55, 56 (Mass. 1901) (Holmes, C.J.)); Gregg v. United States, 113 F.2d 687, 690 
(8th Cir. 1940) (quoting People v. Werblow, 148 N.E. 786, 789 (N.Y. 1925) (Cardozo, J.)).  
 120. See supra Part I.A.1 (describing the scope and limitations of the proximity approaches). 
 121. See supra notes 32–38 and accompanying text (discussing the indispensable-element 
approach). 
 122. See supra notes 20–25 and accompanying text (discussing Rizzo). 
 123. See Peaslee, 59 N.E. at 57. 
 124. See AM. LAW INST., supra note 6, at 323 (describing the test as “unacceptable as a 
working rationale”); LAFAVE, supra note 10, at 626 (repeating with approval the criticism of the 
probable desistance approach that “there exists no basis for making such judgments as when 
desistance is no longer probable or when the normal citizen would stop”). 
 125. United States v. Mandujano, 499 F.2d 370, 372 (5th Cir. 1974). 
 126. Turner, supra note 50, at 237–38.  
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been trying to scam a naive customer out of money the customer was 
willing to pay “out front.” Further, Mandujano provides no indication 
that the Fifth Circuit intended to adopt, or even seriously consider, 
the res ipsa loquitur test. The court mentioned the test only once, in a 
footnote summarizing the MPC Commentators’ review of common-
law doctrines.127 None of the cases upon which Mandujano relied used 
the res ipsa loquitur test. The fact that Mandujano’s conduct might 
have satisfied the res ipsa loquitur test should not indicate that 
Mandujano stood for something other than a full adoption of the 
Code’s substantial step test.128 
2. Statutory Interpretation Analysis of Mandujano.  The court in 
Mandujano stated that there was “no legislative history indicating 
exactly what Congress meant when it used the word ‘attempt’” in the 
relevant statute, 21 U.S.C. § 846.129 The statute contained an attempt 
provision130 but neither § 846 nor any other federal statute defines 
attempt.131 Without the benefit of a statutory definition or legislative 
history, the court sought to cobble together a definition from the 
decisions of federal circuit and district courts, and ultimately the 
MPC.132 In doing so, the court failed to consider the common-law 
meaning of “attempt,” which should have guided its analysis. 
As the Third Circuit has explained, “[i]t is . . . well settled that 
when a federal statute uses a term known to the common law to 
designate a common law offense and does not define that term, courts 
 
 127. Mandujano, 499 F.2d at 373 n.5. 
 128. However, perhaps this fact explains why the Fifth Circuit was willing, two years after 
Mandujano, to employ a version of the res ipsa loquitur test in United States v. Oviedo, 525 F.2d 
881, 885 (5th Cir. 1976) (“[W]e demand that . . . the objective acts performed, without any 
reliance on the accompanying mens rea, mark the defendant’s conduct as criminal in nature.”). 
 129. Mandujano, 499 F.2d at 372. 
 130. The statute punished “[a]ny person who attempts . . . to commit any” of the drug-
related offenses contained in Subchapter I, Title 21, Chapter 13 of the United States Code. 
21 U.S.C. § 846 (2012).  
 131. United States v. Rivera-Sola, 713 F.2d 866, 869 (1st Cir. 1983) (“[N]owhere in federal 
law is there a comprehensive statutory definition of attempt.”); United States v. Joyce, 693 F.2d 
838, 841 (8th Cir. 1982) (“[T]here is no comprehensive statutory definition of attempt in federal 
law.”). It is worth noting that these statements are technically incorrect. There is a statutory 
definition of attempt in the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Uniform Code of Military Justice 
art. 80(a), 10 U.S.C. § 880(a) (2012); see Robert E. Wagner, A Few Good Laws: Why Federal 
Criminal Law Needs a General Attempt Provision and How Military Law Can Provide One, 17 
U. CIN. L. REV. 1043, 1053 (2010) (describing this provision).  
 132. See Mandujano, 499 F.2d at 371–74.  
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called upon to construe it should apply the common-law meaning.”133 
The term “attempt” was known to the common law; attempt crimes 
were recognized by early Roman law codes;134 and in English common 
law the crime dates back to 1784.135 Distinguished American jurists, 
such as Justices Holmes and Cardozo developed the common law of 
attempt when they sat on state supreme courts.136 The drafters of the 
MPC extensively catalogued the common-law interpretation of 
attempt when explaining why the Code rejected common-law 
approaches.137 
Although there are a few exceptions to the general rule of 
applying common-law meaning, they do not apply to the common law 
of attempt. One exception applies when the “history and purposes” of 
a particular statute provide “grounds for inferring [an] affirmative 
instruction” to deviate from a common-law definition.138 Another 
applies when common-law rules have become so unworkable that 
Congress could not have intended to adopt them.139 
The “history and purposes” exception would require a statute-
by-statute analysis and would be wholly inapplicable to any statute in 
which the language of “attempt” was introduced before the MPC had 
been drafted and widely circulated.140 Because there is no legislative 
history whatsoever indicating what Congress intended by the word 
“attempt,”141 there can be no affirmative inference that Congress 
intended to deviate from the word’s traditional common-law 
meaning. 
 
 133. United States v. Patton, 120 F.2d 73, 75 (3d Cir. 1941); see also Morissette v. United 
States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952) (suggesting that “[c]ongressional silence as to . . . elements in an 
Act merely adopting into federal statutory law a concept of crime already so well defined in 
common law” may warrant an inference that Congress intended to adopt the common-law 
definition). 
 134. MEEHAN & CURRIE, supra note 1, at 10 (discussing the history of attempt crimes).  
 135. Brodie, supra note 4, at 238 (citing R v. Scofield, (1784) Cald. 397 (K.B.)).  
 136. Commonwealth v. Peaslee, 59 N.E. 55 (Mass. 1901) (Holmes, C.J.); People v. Werblow, 
148 N.E. 786 (N.Y. 1925) (Cardozo, J.).  
 137. AM. LAW INST., supra note 6, at 321–29.  
 138. Morissette, 342 U.S. at 263–73. 
 139. See United States v. Everett, 700 F.2d 900, 904–06 (3d Cir. 1983) (explaining how the 
doctrine of impossibility became unworkable and “a source of utter frustration” (quoting 
United States v. Thomas, 32 C.M.R. 278, 288 (C.M.A. 1962))). 
 140. E.g., Hobbs Act, Pub. L. 80-772, § 1951, 62 Stat. 683, 793–94 (1948) (codified as 
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2012)). 
 141. United States v. Mandujano, 499 F.2d 370, 372 (5th Cir. 1974). 
FISHMAN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/2/2015  1:05 PM 
362 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 65:345 
Indeed, the opposite may be the case, as indicated by the 
occasional use of the word “endeavor” in criminal statutes.142 Courts 
have interpreted the word “endeavor” as “connot[ing] a somewhat 
lower threshold of purposeful activity than ‘attempt.’”143 In United 
States v. Russell,144 the Supreme Court accepted a broad definition of 
“endeavor” when interpreting an obstruction-of-justice statute.145 The 
Court was persuaded by legislative history that indicated Congress’s 
intention to “g[e]t rid of the technicalities which might be urged as 
besetting the word ‘attempt’” by using the word “endeavor.”146 The 
Court’s interpretation reinforces that the word “attempt” has 
traditionally been read to include certain “technicalities” that limited 
its scope.147 When Congress used “endeavor” it gave prosecutors free 
rein but when Congress used “attempt” it adopted the common law’s 
limitations. This makes any argument for an affirmative instruction to 
construe “attempt” more broadly than at common law even less 
plausible. 
Nevertheless, one court identified an affirmative legislative 
instruction to deviate from the common law based on the history and 
purpose of 21 U.S.C. § 846, which provided an attempt provision for a 
wide range of drug offenses.148 According to the Sixth Circuit in 
United States v. Reeves,149 Congress’s intent in fashioning the attempt 
provision was unquestionably broad, and designed to “eliminate 
technical obstacles” to law enforcement and prosecution.150 Reeves 
 
 142. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (2012) (punishing endeavors to influence jurors or court 
officials); 18 U.S.C. § 2192 (2012) (punishing endeavors to incite mutiny on a United States 
ship).  
 143. United States v. Lazzerini, 611 F.2d 940, 941 (1st Cir. 1979). The Fifth Circuit held that 
an endeavor included even “experimental approaches” to committing the underlying offense. 
Overton v. United States, 403 F.2d 444, 446 (5th Cir. 1968).  
 144. United States v. Russell, 255 U.S. 138 (1921). 
 145. Id. at 143. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. For example, the Court held that defendants could not avail themselves of the 
common-law defense of impossibility when charged with an endeavor to commit a substantive 
crime. Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 333 (1966) (citing Russell, 255 U.S. at 143).  
 148. 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2012). Though other courts deviated from the common law by 
adopting the MPC’s substantial step test, they did not do so based on a perceived congressional 
instruction. See supra Part II.B.  
 149. United States v. Reeves, 794 F.2d 1101 (6th Cir. 1986). 
 150. Id. at 1104 (“[T]here can be no question that the Congressional intent in fashioning the 
attempt provision as part of an all-out effort to reach all acts and activities related to the drug 
traffic was all inclusive and calculated to eliminate technical obstacles confronting law 
enforcement . . . .”). 
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relied on another court’s statement that the statute “makes it 
apparent that Congress . . . intended to encompass every act and 
activity which could lead to a proliferation of drug traffic. Nothing in 
the statute indicates any congressional intent to limit the reach of this 
legislation, which is described in its very title as ‘Comprehensive.’”151 
This logic is tenuous at best, essentially asserting that because 
Congress criminalized a broad range of activity courts should extend 
the statute whenever reasonably possible. The reverse could just as 
easily be inferred from the same legislative history: Congress 
specified a broad range of activity to criminalize, which it found to be 
“[c]omprehensive,” and therefore any activity not unambiguously 
included in the statute was not meant to be criminalized. Surprisingly, 
despite finding an affirmative instruction to read the statute more 
broadly, the court also referred to one of the narrow common-law 
formulations of attempt, a version of the res ipsa loquitur test.152 
Courts are also willing to deviate from common-law definitions 
without an explicit legislative instruction when the common-law 
definitions are burdened by “hair-splitting”153 or “unworkable 
distinctions.”154 Whatever confusion might have accompanied 
common-law attempt jurisprudence, there is no indication that 
common-law act requirements were ever so unworkable that 
Congress could not possibly have meant to adopt them. That level of 
unworkability is reserved for cases like the impossibility defense to 
attempt, an area of law “fraught with intricacies and artificial 
distinctions,” and described as “an illusory test leading to 
contradictory, and sometimes absurd, results.”155 By contrast, 
common-law formulations of attempt’s conduct requirement continue 
to be the law in some jurisdictions, where judges presumably find 
their standards workable.156 Although the MPC’s drafters rejected the 
 
 151. Id. (quoting United States v. Gomez, 593 F.2d 210, 212–13 (3d Cir. 1979)).  
 152. See id. (applying the rule that a defendant’s acts must, by themselves, “mark the 
defendant’s conduct as criminal in nature”). 
 153. United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 406–07 (1980). 
 154. United States v. Everett, 700 F.2d 900, 904–05 (3d Cir. 1983). 
 155. State v. Moretti, 244 A.2d 499, 503 (N.J. 1968). 
 156. Massachusetts continues to use the proximity analysis codified in Peaslee. E.g., 
Commonwealth v. Bell, 917 N.E.2d 740, 746 (Mass. 2009). New York similarly continues to rely 
on Rizzo and the common-law proximity analysis. E.g., People v. Omwathath, 965 N.Y.S.2d 687, 
689 (N.Y. App. Term 2013).  
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common-law tests, they did so due to policy considerations, not a 
belief that the common-law tests were unworkable.157 
Analyzing the word “attempt” according to its common-law 
meaning poses a challenge because the word had multiple meanings 
at common law.158 If federal courts should define attempt according to 
the common law, should they use a proximity approach, the res ipsa 
loquitur test, or the probable desistance test? To begin, the answer is 
not “the MPC.” The existence of multiple common-law definitions of 
attempt did not give courts license to apply a definition unknown to 
the common law. When multiple common-law meanings exist at the 
time a statute was drafted, “it [is] more appropriate to inquire which 
of the common-law readings of the term best accords with the overall 
purposes of the statute.”159 The Mandujano court and the circuits that 
followed did not inquire which common-law definition of attempt 
best fit the purposes of the predicate statutes, but instead adopted a 
uniform standard across all attempt statutes that was substantially 
different from any common-law definition.160 
3. Conducting the Appropriate Analysis.  Well-established tools 
of statutory interpretation should guide any court faced with a statute 
containing an attempt provision. That is, the court should attempt to 
ascertain legislative intent as embodied in the language of the 
particular statute. This analysis may be problematic in that it requires 
the courts to accept as true certain fictions: that a given legislature 
possessed an unstated intent for the law’s meaning, or that a 
deliberative body made up of multiple people can even have an 
intent.161 By asking what the enacting legislature intended, judges 
must essentially read the minds of past legislators with few tools to 
 
 157. See AM. LAW INST., supra note 6, at 329–31 (discussing the policy considerations 
guiding the Code’s rejection of common-law tests in favor of the substantial step test). 
 158. LAFAVE, supra note 10, at 622–28.  
 159. Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 116 (1990); see also United States v. Turley, 352 
U.S. 407, 411–13 (1957) (stating that, if Congress uses a term with multiple common-law 
meanings in a criminal statute, the term should be interpreted according to the meaning which is 
supported by the term’s historic usage as well as the purpose of the law and its legislative 
history).  
 160. See supra Part I.B (discussing the differences between the substantial step test and 
common-law tests). 
 161. See Eric A. Johnson, Dynamic Incorporation of the General Part: Criminal Law’s 
Missing (Hyper)Link, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1831, 1869–76 (2015) (criticizing the use of 
statutory interpretation techniques that focus on a legislature’s intent). 
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guide them.162 Further, courts may be put in the position of claiming 
to “discover” the answer to questions of law that could not have 
existed during the time of the enacting legislature.163 
A statutory interpretation analysis that focuses on the common 
law as it existed at the time of a statute’s enactment can perhaps be 
best justified as a default rule.164 Courts interpreting statutes will 
eventually be forced to apply default rules; the alternative would be 
to fill legislative gaps with personal policy judgments.165 “Normally, 
this will (and does) dictate applying some form of default rule that 
estimates the preferences of the enacting or current government.”166 
An interpretation that is ascertained by use of a default rule “must be 
within the range of plausible statutory meanings” in order to be fair 
and effective.167 Legislators cannot be said to legislate ex ante around 
the application of a default rule if they do not know what the default 
rule will be. 
Some theories of default rules suggest that statutes should be 
construed to elicit legislative response, rather than to reflect 
legislative preferences.168 The general concept is that courts 
interpreting ambiguous statutory language should interpret the 
statute in a way that discourages ambiguity.169 Even those theories, 
however, do not “justify adopting interpretations that parties were 
entitled to assume lay outside the range of possible statute 
meanings.”170 In the case of attempt provisions enacted before the 
MPC, all relevant parties were perfectly entitled to assume that such 
provisions would not be interpreted according to some yet-unknown 
definition of attempt. They would have been particularly unable to 
guess that the novel interpretation did not come from judges, but 
 
 162. See id. at 1874 (describing how static incorporation may be “extraordinarily complex”).  
 163. See id. (explaining that, for crimes that did not exist when Congress adopted a 
particular statute, “[t]he Court probably would have been pretending, then, if it had claimed to 
‘discover’ a definitive answer in the judge-made law”). 
 164. See generally Einer Elhauge, Preference-Eliciting Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. 
L. REV. 2162, 2254 (2002) (describing the use of default rules in statutory interpretation).  
 165. Id. at 2164–65. 
 166. Id. at 2165. 
 167. Id. at 2170.  
 168. Id. The rationale behind these theories is that courts should interpret ambiguous 
statutory language in a way that discourages ambiguity. Id. at 2169–70. 
 169. Id. at 2169–71. 
 170. Id. 
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rather from the American Law Institute, an unelected private group 
that proposed substantial changes to state criminal law codes.171 
An analysis that focuses on the meaning of the statute’s text 
should therefore govern the interpretation of the conduct 
requirement for attempts. That meaning can be best ascertained by 
reference to the common law. Under this analysis, courts would 
choose one of the common-law approaches: proximity, probable 
desistance, or res ipsa loquitur. Choosing among these approaches 
presents two questions. First, should the meaning of attempt be 
uniform across the criminal law, or might each attempt provision be 
interpreted differently? Second, how should courts determine which 
of the common-law approaches “best accords with the overall 
purposes”172 of attempt law generally, or of any particular attempt 
provision specifically? 
a. How Many Definitions of Attempt?  When Congress uses the 
same word in multiple statutes, courts do not necessarily assume that 
its carries over across statutes.173 Although no court has stated that the 
definition of attempt may vary from statute to statute, one has 
considered the context of a particular statute when interpreting an 
attempt provision.174 It seems to be the common practice for courts to 
assume that attempts are the same across federal criminal statutes.175 
 
 171. See PAUL H. ROBINSON & MARKUS DIRK DUBBER, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE 
MODEL PENAL CODE 3, https://www.law.upenn.edu/fac/phrobins/intromodpencode.pdf [http://
perma.cc/UH34-XK2D] (“When the Institute undertook its work on criminal law, however, it 
judged the existing law too chaotic and irrational to merit ‘restatement.’ What was needed, the 
Institute concluded, was a model code, which states might use to draft new criminal codes.”). 
 172. Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 116 (1990). 
 173. See, e.g., Atl. Cleaners & Dryers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 433 (1932) (“Most 
words have different shades of meaning, and consequently may be variously construed, not only 
when they occur in different statutes, but when used more than once in the same statute or even 
the same section.”). But see Pub. Citizen v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 901 F.2d 147, 155 
(D.C. Cir. 1990) (interpreting the word “requirements” by reference to its use in other statutes). 
 174. See supra notes 150–52 and accompanying text (discussing United States v. Reeves, 794 
F.2d 1101 (6th Cir. 1986)).  
 175. See, e.g., United States v. Mandujano, 499 F.2d 370, 373–76 (5th Cir. 1974) (quoting and 
analyzing cases that interpreted attempt under various statutes); United States v. McFadden, 
739 F.2d 149, 152 (4th Cir. 1984) (applying Mandujano’s standard to an attempt provision in a 
bank robbery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a)); United States v. Snell, 627 F.2d 186, 187–88 (9th Cir. 
1980) (applying Mandujano’s test to an attempted Hobbs Act robbery, under 18 U.S.C. § 1951, 
without explaining why the definition of attempt should be transferrable); United States v. 
Monholland, 607 F.2d 1311, 1319–20 (10th Cir. 1979) (applying Mandujano’s standard to an 
attempt provision in a statute that prohibited attempting to damage property involved in 
interstate commerce, 18 U.S.C. § 844, and treating definitions of attempt as transferrable across 
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That Congress has consistently declined to define attempt by 
statute indicates that the definition of attempt should apply generally 
rather than on a statute-by-statute basis. Without any internal 
reference, the definition of attempt must come from outside the 
statutory text, from some broader idea of attempt law that Congress 
understood as contained within the word “attempt.” Assuming 
Congress intended for attempt to have any meaning at all, only one 
source could have provided that meaning when attempt provisions 
were first enacted: the common law of attempt. By consistently 
referring to attempt without defining the term, Congress suggests that 
attempt law exists apart from statutory definition, and that each usage 
refers to the same root concept. The common law is the only viable 
“root.” 
When Congress intends for the act requirement of a generally 
applicable criminal provision to vary across statutes, it may say so. 
Courts have held that this is what Congress did for federal conspiracy 
provisions.176 In 1948, Congress enacted a general conspiracy 
provision for the federal law under which liability would not be 
imposed unless “one or more of [the conspirators] do any act to effect 
the object of the conspiracy.”177 This was a deviation from the 
common law of conspiracies, which held that “a conspiracy was 
punishable even though no act was done beyond the mere making of 
the agreement.”178 When Congress subsequently enacted conspiracy 
provisions for individual crimes that punished only “conspiracies” 
without including the additional act requirement in the statute’s text, 
courts inferred an affirmative legislative instruction to apply the 
broader common-law act requirement to the conspiracies Congress 
had singled out.179 There are no comparable signals from Congress 
that it intended the act requirement of attempt provisions to vary 
across statutes. 
Another approach that supports a uniform interpretation of 
attempt provisions is the belief that Congress would never have 
intended to make a fundamental change in the nature of attempt law 
without saying so explicitly. The Supreme Court has referred to this 
 
statutes); United States v. Stallworth, 543 F.2d 1038 (2d Cir. 1976) (applying Mandujano’s 
standard to an attempt provision in a bank robbery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a)). 
 176. LAFAVE, supra note 10, at 661. 
 177. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2012). 
 178. LAFAVE, supra note 10, at 661. 
 179. See id. (citing United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10 (1947); Singer v. United States, 323 
U.S. 338 (1945); Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373 (1913)). 
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idea as the “dog that didn’t bark.”180 Before the MPC was 
promulgated, attempt crimes were defined exclusively by the common 
law. Had Congress ever intended to define one particular attempt 
provision differently from all others, it surely would have said so. But 
Congress has never given any indication that it intended to change 
the meaning of attempt. Indeed, when Congress did intend to punish 
activity that was similar to attempt while avoiding the common-law 
rules that limited the scope of liability, it used the word “endeavor.”181 
Therefore, if courts seek to interpret the elements of attempt 
provisions in accordance with congressional intent, they must do so 
uniformly across statutes. 
b. Which Definition?  Whether or not courts define attempt 
uniformly across statutes, courts operating under a statutory 
interpretation analysis should determine which of the common-law 
attempt definitions to apply. In so doing, they must be guided by the 
purposes of the criminal law.182 Whichever approach they choose, 
courts must select from the common-law tests: a proximity approach, 
a probable desistance approach, or res ipsa loquitur.183 
Courts should adopt a proximity approach to attempt if they 
believe the purpose of punishing an attempt is “to prevent some harm 
which is foreseen as likely to follow . . . under the circumstances.”184 
Proximity approaches are well tailored to this purpose because they 
do not punish a defendant “until the defendant has come dangerously 
 
 180. See Church of Scientology of Cal. v. IRS, 484 U.S. 9, 17–18 (1987) (reasoning that “[a]ll 
in all, we think this is a case where common sense suggests, by analogy to Sir Arthur Conan 
Doyle’s ‘dog that didn’t bark,’” that significant legislative change would have garnered more 
substantial congressional comment); Harrison v. PPG Indus., Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 602 (1980) 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“In a case where the construction of legislative language . . . makes 
so sweeping and so relatively unorthodox a change as that made here, I think judges as well as 
detectives may take into consideration the fact that a watchdog did not bark in the night.”). The 
phrase refers to a Sherlock Holmes story in which the detective deduces the villain’s identity 
from a watchdog’s silence. See SIR ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, SILVER BLAZE (Baker Press 
2012).  
 181. See supra notes 142–46 and accompanying text (explaining Congress’s use of the word 
“endeavor”).  
 182. See Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 116 (1990) (“[I]t [is] more appropriate to 
inquire which of the common-law meanings of the term best accords with the overall purposes 
of the statute . . . .”); United States v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407, 411–13 (1957) (stating that, if 
Congress uses a term with multiple common-law meanings in a criminal statute, the term should 
be interpreted according to the purpose of the law and its legislative history).  
 183. See supra Part I.A. (discussing categories of common-law attempt definitions). 
 184. HOLMES, supra note 15, at 64–65. 
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close to accomplishing the completed crime.”185 If “the primary 
purpose of punishing individuals is to neutralize dangerous 
individuals and not to deter dangerous acts,”186 however, the 
proximity approaches are poorly suited to the task. Consider the 
defendants in Peaslee or Rizzo.187 From Peaslee and Rizzo’s actions, 
one can readily determine that they were “dangerous” individuals. 
There is every reason to believe that both men would have carried 
out their intended crimes had they not been intercepted by law 
enforcement. The ability of such dangerous individuals to evade 
conviction represents the greatest weakness of the proximity 
approach. 
Proximity approaches have one distinct advantage over the other 
common-law approaches, and even over the MPC’s substantial step 
test: flexibility. Under the dangerous proximity analysis described by 
Justice Holmes, one factor for determining an attempt is “the gravity 
of the crime” attempted.188 Given the wide scope of attempt 
provisions within the federal law, an ability to tailor the conduct 
requirement of attempt crimes to the dangerousness of the predicate 
crime could be beneficial. For example, consider the defendant who 
unsuccessfully searches for the intended victim of his crime. Should it 
matter whether the defendant’s intended crime is a scheme to defraud 
the victim of money189 or a scheme to commit sexual abuse of a 
minor?190 Judges may well be inclined to make such a distinction. 
The courts should not accept the probable desistance approach, 
as its infirmities are too great. The justification of the probable 
desistance approach is that it bases attempt liability on the 
dangerousness of the actor.191 The difficulty of implementation, 
however, weighs against the use of this standard.192 Courts would have 
to decide whether the test referred to: (1) the specific probability that 
a particular defendant would give up his criminal plan; or (2) the 
general probability that any person who has gone as far as the 
 
 185. LAFAVE, supra note 10, at 625.  
 186. AM. LAW INST., supra note 6, at 323.  
 187. See supra Part I.A.1 (describing common-law proximity doctrines). 
 188. Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 48 N.E. 770, 771 (Mass. 1897).  
 189. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012) (criminalizing mail fraud and including an attempt provision). 
 190. 18 U.S.C. § 2243 (2012) (criminalizing sexual abuse of a minor or ward and including an 
attempt provision). 
 191. AM. LAW INST., supra note 6, at 324–25. 
 192. See id. (criticizing the probable desistance approach as impractical); LAFAVE, supra 
note 10, at 626 (same). 
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defendant had would give up their criminal plan.193 If courts accepted 
the first, jurors would be asked to read the mind of an individual 
defendant. Given this instruction, jurors might base their decisions on 
beliefs that people of a certain race, age, or gender are more likely to 
be criminals. If courts accepted the second choice, jurors would have 
little basis for their decision, as “there exists no basis for making such 
judgments as when the desistance is no longer probable or when the 
normal citizen would stop.”194 Further, one may ask whether anyone 
who has undertaken a criminal endeavor is likely to voluntarily give 
up their plan before completion.195 
The res ipsa loquitur test is well tailored to the goal of punishing 
dangerous persons. “[O]nce [an] actor must desist or perform acts 
that he realizes would incriminate him . . . in all probability a firmer 
state of mind exists.”196 The MPC’s Commentaries illustrate this by 
the example of a hunter. He brings “extra supplies to facilitate an 
escape in the event he resolves to kill his companion” on his hunting 
trip; he also brings poison.197 By bringing extra supplies, he may 
merely be thinking about committing murder, but by bringing poison 
he probably has decided to do so and is therefore more dangerous.198 
Judges may also favor the res ipsa loquitur test because it is relatively 
similar to the test currently used. The “substantial step” test requires 
conduct that is strongly corroborative of criminal intent, similar to the 
res ipsa loquitur test’s requirement that a defendant’s conduct be 
completely corroborative of criminal intent.199 
 
 193. LAFAVE, supra note 10, at 626 (criticizing the probable desistance approach as 
impractical). 
 194. Id. (citing Donald Stuart, The Actus Reus in Attempts, 1970 CRIM. L.R. 505, 509).  
 195. See Parker v. State, 113 S.E. 218, 219 (Ga. Ct. App. 1922) (describing that it is a 
question of fact for the jury whether the defendant would have “turned away from the 
consummation of the crime”). But see Robert H. Skilton, The Requisite Act in a Criminal 
Attempt, 3 U. PITT. L. REV. 308, 310 (1937) (“All of us, or most of us, at some time or other 
harbor what may be described as criminal intent . . . . Many of us take some steps—often slight 
enough in character—to bring the consequences about; but most of us, when we reach a certain 
point, desist, and return to our roles as law-abiding citizens.”).  
 196. AM. LAW INST., supra note 6, at 329.  
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. 
 199. See id. at 326 (describing the res ipsa loquitur test as requiring that “the actor’s conduct 
unequivocally manifest an intent to commit a crime” (emphasis added)); id. at 330 (“The basic 
rationale of the requirement that the actor’s conduct shall strongly corroborate his purpose is, of 
course, the same as that underlying the res ipsa loquitur view.”). 
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Two weaknesses of the res ipsa loquitur test are the exclusion of 
confessions and the stringent nature of its act requirement.200 Because 
attempt crimes inherently punish noncriminal activity made criminal 
by the defendant’s state of mind, confessions or other statements by 
the defendant can often play an important role in attempt cases.201 
Consider “the case of a defendant who goes up to a haystack, fills his 
pipe, and lights a match.”202 Due to the strict requirement of an 
unequivocal act, those acts alone could not support a conviction of 
attempted arson, even if the defendant later confessed his plan to 
burn the haystack.203 Judges may find that the highly restrictive nature 
of the res ipsa loquitur test, along the total exclusion of confessions, is 
inconsistent with attempt law’s goal of incarcerating dangerous actors 
and punishing dangerous acts. 
Are there any arguments based on statutory interpretation for 
interpreting attempt provisions according to the substantial step test? 
Moving forward from Mandujano, one plausible argument is that 
Congress has now, by its silence, accepted the new judge-made 
definition. This theory has the same general justification as the 
principle of interpreting undefined statutory terms according to their 
common-law meaning: that Congress legislates against the 
background of judicial decisions, and can deviate explicitly from those 
definitions if it desires.204 This theory poses a number of problems. 
First, if this position were to be accepted, it would not be clear when 
Congressional silence amounted to acceptance, other than that it 
occurred some time after Mandujano. Surely Congress could not be 
expected to respond immediately to a single circuit court decision. 
How many circuit court decisions are necessary to constitute a “new 
common law” that overrides the old? Second, this position is 
troublesome because it rests on the notion that the appropriate 
response to a serious judicial error is acceptance. This should not only 
prove worrisome to those who believe that judges have a duty to 
answer legal questions correctly; it should also worry those who see 
 
 200. LAFAVE, supra note 10, at 626–27.  
 201. See id. at 626–28 (discussing the res ipsa loquitur test and the exclusion of confessions). 
 202. Id. at 627 n.58 (citing GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART 
630 (2d ed. 1961)).  
 203. WILLIAMS, supra note 202, at 630. 
 204. See Mendelovitz v. Vosicky, 40 F.3d 182, 184 (7th Cir. 1994) (referencing “the judicial 
presumption that Congress legislates against the background of prior judicial interpretations of 
statutes that it uses as models”). 
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undelegated judicial lawmaking as a usurpation of the legislature’s 
exclusive power to create and define crimes. 
c. Incorporation.  The statutory interpretation analysis assumes 
that courts interpreting attempt provisions engage in statutory 
analysis at all. Under theories of “incorporation,” courts are not 
engaged in statutory interpretation, but are incorporating concepts of 
judge-made law that exist in the ether, separate from statutory text or 
legislative intent.205 According to these theories, when legislatures 
create statutes they sometimes “incorporate” preexisting bodies of 
law.206 A static incorporation analysis is identical to a statutory 
interpretation analysis; it involves looking to the state of the common 
law as it existed when particular statutory language was drafted and 
“incorporating” that body of common law by reference.207 
Under a dynamic incorporation analysis, a statute that references 
common-law concepts incorporates not only the boundaries of that 
concept as they existed when the statute was enacted, but creates a 
“hyperlink” which incorporates by reference any future changes to 
the common law.208 Because the judges interpreting the common law 
are the same ones changing it, dynamic incorporation is not so much a 
method of statutory interpretation as it is a form of legislating 
delegated to the courts.209 Therefore, a court analyzing a concept that 
it believes has been dynamically incorporated will not look to the 
state of the common law as it existed at the time a statute was 
 
 205. See generally Johnson, supra note 161 (describing the theory of “dynamic 
incorporation” as a form of delegated lawmaking). 
 206. Id. at 1850. 
 207. See, e.g., JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 3.02[A], at 29 (5th 
ed. 2009) (describing statutory interpretation by incorporation of common law). 
 208. See Johnson, supra note 161, at 1855–56 (“Just as the content of a hyperlinked website 
does not depend on the words or symbols in which the hyperlink is embedded, the content of 
the dynamically incorporated body of judge-made law does not depend on the words by which 
the incorporation is accomplished.”).  
 209. Id. at 1854–56; see Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law?, 110 
HARV. L. REV. 469, 472 (1996) (“[F]ederal criminal law should be viewed as a system of 
delegated common law-making.”). Federal Rule of Evidence 501 provides an explicit example 
of statutory language that calls for dynamic incorporation. The rule provides that “[t]he 
common law—as interpreted by United States courts in the light of reason and experience—
governs a claim of privilege.” FED. R. EVID. 501; see also 42 U.S.C. § 6928(f)(4) (explicitly 
incorporating common-law defenses as “determined by the courts of the United States 
according to the principles of common law as they may be interpreted in the light of reason and 
experience”).  
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enacted, but will look to the current state of the common law and its 
own policy judgments, informed by “reason and experience.”210 
Mandujano’s analysis can be best explained by dynamic 
incorporation, even if that analysis cannot justify the outcome. The 
court discussed federal cases interpreting the meaning of attempt 
under § 846, and held that “fundamental agreement” among federal 
courts justified adopting the substantial step standard.211 Viewed in 
the light of a dynamic incorporation analysis, the Mandujano court’s 
reasoning makes sense. Without legislative history or a statutory 
definition, the court believed dynamic incorporation was appropriate. 
The court did not look to traditional common-law meanings of 
attempt because it was dynamically incorporating the concept of 
attempt. The Mandujano court perceived that attempt law had 
changed or should change, and based its holding on that perception. 
The First Circuit, in United States v. Dworken,212 articulated a 
rationale for adopting the MPC’s substantial step test that essentially 
mirrors the dynamic incorporation analysis. According to the First 
Circuit, because attempt has always been left to judicial definition, 
the court was free to adopt the definition of attempt that “seem[ed] to 
[it] to make the most sense.”213 The court stated that it would be 
willing to reconsider the definition of attempt if it were “persuaded 
that some other standard would better reflect the purposes of the 
criminal law,” and made no mention of legislative intent or of 
statutory interpretation.214 
Even accepting dynamic incorporation as the proper analytical 
method, Mandujano’s holding was still incorrect on two grounds. 
First, it misstated the holdings of the cases on which it claimed to rely. 
The cases Mandujano cited for the proposition that a defendant’s 
conduct need only “be more than remote preparation” required that 
a defendant’s conduct advance significantly further than that.215 
 
 210. Johnson, supra note 161, at 1849–51. 
 211. United States v. Mandujano, 499 F.2d 370, 372–76 (5th Cir. 1974). 
 212. United States v. Dworken, 855 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1988). 
 213. Id. at 17 n.4.  
 214. Id. (emphasis added). 
 215. See Mandujano, 499 F.2d at 376–77. The first case cited by Mandujano on the remote 
preparation question, Gregg v. United States, 113 F.2d 687 (8th Cir. 1940), rev’d on other 
grounds, 116 F.2d 609 (8th Cir. 1940), quotes an enumeration of the dangerous proximity test. 
Gregg, 113 F.2d at 690. In Gregg, the court was analyzing the attempt provision of a statute that 
prohibited transportation of liquor across state lines. Id. at 690. The court in Gregg rejected the 
defendant-appellant’s arguments because it held that the conduct of transporting liquor across 
state lines was a “continuing act not confined in its scope to the single instant of passage across a 
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Although many of the attempt cases cited by Mandujano used the 
phrase “overt act” to describe the conduct requirement, they 
demonstrated a uniform agreement that an “overt act” must advance 
beyond the conduct required by the substantial step test.216 If the 
Mandujano court was trying to use an attempt definition that had 
already been widely accepted by federal courts, it failed to do so. 
Although no previous court had adopted the substantial step 
test, under dynamic incorporation the court may arguably have been 
authorized to do so by delegation of lawmaking authority.217 Even 
accepting that a delegated-lawmaking approach is analytically 
appropriate for attempt provisions, one must still determine how 
much lawmaking authority has been delegated. And even if Congress 
delegated to courts the authority to choose between and refine 
common-law concepts, there is no reason to believe Congress 
delegated the authority to change attempt law entirely. Judge Pierre 
Leval has suggested that a court engaged in this type of analysis 
should be guided and restricted by “the same considerations that 
 
territorial boundary.” Id. at 691. Therefore, although the defendant was not dangerously 
proximate to any state boundary, the defendant was still “dangerously proximate” to the 
conduct of interstate transportation of liquor. See id. (“[W]hen he loaded the liquor into his car 
and began his journey toward Kansas, . . . he was engaged in an attempt to transport liquor into 
Kansas . . . .”).  
  The holding of the second case, United States v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1950), 
provides no indication that the conduct of attempt need only be more than remote preparation. 
The court there merely held that the “last proximate act” was not necessary to sustain an 
attempt conviction. Coplon, 185 F.2d at 633.  
  In People v. Buffum, 256 P.2d 317 (Cal. 1953), overruled on other grounds by People v. 
Morante, 975 P.2d 1071 (Cal. 1999), the third case cited by Mandujano for the proposition that a 
substantial step must only “be more than remote preparation,” the court held that the 
defendants’ conduct was insufficient as a matter of law because their conduct did not amount to 
“a direct, unequivocal act done toward the commission of the offense.” Buffum, 256 P.2d at 321.  
 216. For example, in Wooldridge v. United States, 237 F. 775 (9th Cir. 1916), the defendant 
was charged with attempt to commit statutory rape. Wooldridge, 237 F. at 775. The evidence 
showed that the defendant had procured the agreement of a sixteen-year-old girl to meet at a 
specific place to have intercourse, that he did meet her at that time and place with the intent to 
have sexual intercourse with her, but that he was “prevented and intercepted in the execution of 
his purpose.” Id. Although this would undoubtedly be sufficient as a matter of law under the 
MPC’s definition, which includes “enticing . . . the contemplated victim of the crime to go to the 
place contemplated for its commission,” MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(2)(b) (1962), the court 
held that there was no evidence “of an overt act toward the commission of the crime charged.” 
Wooldridge, 237 F. at 779. Wooldridge is discussed in Mandujano, 499 F.2d at 373–74. 
 217. Johnson, supra note 161, at 1854–57 (“Under dynamic incorporation, the statute’s 
command to the courts is not ‘[t]ry to figure out what we would have done in your place’ but, 
rather, ‘decide for yourself.’”). 
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governed the development of the [common-law] doctrine.”218 Of 
course, in many cases, analyzing such “considerations” will require an 
analysis that is essentially identical to a statutory interpretation 
analysis, that is, looking to the common law to derive general 
principles that are applicable to a particular case. 
What were the “considerations” guiding the creation of the 
common-law tests? By punishing attempts, rather than only 
completed conduct, the common-law attempt doctrines recognized 
some of the considerations that justify the MPC’s substantial step 
formulation: deterrence,219 retribution,220 the intervention of law 
enforcement,221 and the prevention of future crimes.222 By only 
punishing conduct that brings the defendant very close to the end of a 
particular attempt timeline,223 and by punishing those attempts to a 
lesser degree than completed crimes,224 the common law revealed that 
it was also guided by a profound discomfort with the notion of 
imposing criminal penalties against someone who had not yet 
committed the conduct of a substantive offense.225 If the Mandujano 
court felt the same type of restraint described by Judge Leval, it 
would not have adopted the substantial step test, which fails to fully 
capture the common law’s unwillingness to punish individuals or acts 
without a clear demonstration of dangerousness. 
Even accepting that the Mandujano court was engaged in 
“dynamic incorporation” or “delegated lawmaking” rather than 
 
 218. Pierre N. Leval, Trademark: Champion of Free Speech, 27 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 187, 
197 (2004).  
 219. See Paul R. Hoeber, The Abandonment Defense to Criminal Attempt and Other 
Problems of Temporal Individuation, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 377, 387–89, nn.36–46 (1986) (analyzing 
the claim that attempt law is justified by the goal of deterring attempts, which are themselves 
dangerous).  
 220. See MEEHAN & CURRIE, supra note 1, at 31–33 (explaining that “[a]lmost all countries 
allot a greater punishment to the completed crime than to the attempt,” because society is less 
retributive toward an individual who attempted a crime than one who committed the crime).  
 221. See C. HOWARD, CRIMINAL LAW 286 (4th ed. 1982) (“[T]he object of the law of 
attempt is to justify the arrest and prosecution without waiting for the defendant to commit the 
crime.”).  
 222. See AM. LAW INST., supra note 6, at 490 (stating that “danger[] presented by the actor” 
justified punishment of attempts).  
 223. See supra Part I.A (describing the common-law attempt doctrines, all of which required 
a defendant’s conduct to come quite close to the completed crime). 
 224. AM. LAW INST., supra note 6, at 490 (stating that attempts are to be punished less than 
completed crimes).  
 225. See Skilton, supra note 195, at 309–10 (describing the common law’s unwillingness to 
impose sanctions on those engaged in mere preparation).  
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impermissible judicial definition and expansion of criminal law,226 its 
decision was misguided. By adopting a substantial step test, the 
Mandujano court failed to create a rule that was guided by the same 
principles that had guided the development of the common law. 
III.  WHY MANDUJANO’S ERROR MATTERS 
This Part will discuss the problems created by Mandujano. 
Section A will describe how, by adopting the MPC’s definition of 
attempt, courts expanded the scope of attempt liability beyond what 
Congress had made criminal. This, in itself, is an injustice that 
warrants a remedy.227 Further, adopting the substantial step test has 
also caused confusion among courts that have struggled to understand 
how to adopt a concept from the MPC, rather than from a statute or 
the common law. Section B discusses one instance of this confusion, 
as federal courts have had difficulty defining the limits of the 
substantial step analysis. Section C considers another area of 
doctrinal confusion, wherein courts have struggled to understand 
what to make of renunciation, subjecting defendants to the MPC’s 
expanded attempt liability without the counterbalance of an 
affirmative defense. 
A. Separation of Powers 
The creation of federal crimes is the exclusive province of 
Congress, not the courts.228 Considered against the background of the 
common law, Mandujano and its progeny have expanded criminal 
liability beyond that created by the legislature. Under common-law 
attempt doctrines, certain conduct—like assembling a stack of 
combustibles and placing a candle in the room with intent to commit 
arson—was merely preparation and not subject to criminal liability.229 
Mandujano took a segment of the legal activity of “preparation” and 
 
 226. See United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95 (1820) (Marshall, C.J.) (“It is 
the legislature, not the Court, which is to define a crime . . . .”). 
 227. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971) (“[L]egislatures and not courts should 
define criminal activity.”); Alex Kozinski, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers: Revisited, 112 
HARV. L. REV. 1876, 1877 (1999) (“[W]e are not common law judges; we are judges in an age of 
statutes. For us, justice consists of applying the laws passed by the legislature, precisely as 
written by the legislature. Unlike common law judges, we have no power to bend the law to 
satisfy our own sense of right and wrong.”). 
 228. United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. 32, 33 (1812).  
 229. See supra Part I.A (describing the conduct covered by common-law attempt crimes). 
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subjected that segment to criminal penalties.230 In so doing, the court 
rewrote attempt law “under the guise of construing it.”231 
B. Defining Substantial Step 
Despite the assertions of circuit courts that they have adopted 
the MPC’s standards,232 the extent to which they have done so is 
unclear. For example, just one year after Mandujano, the Fifth Circuit 
held that a defendant’s acts must, by themselves, be “unique” and 
“mark the defendant’s conduct as criminal in nature.”233 These 
requirements amount to an adoption of the res ipsa loquitur test.234 
Adopting that test does not merely refine or narrow Mandujano’s 
holding, it applies a radically different test;235 however, the court did 
not say that it was overturning or narrowing Mandujano. One 
explanation could be that the court was not actually referring to the 
act requirement of attempt, but rather expressing “a concern with the 
need for adequate proof of criminal intent in addition to proof of the 
act.”236 
The Eighth Circuit, in the same case in which it adopted the 
“substantial step” test, indicated that a defendant’s acts would only 
constitute a substantial step if his conduct, when “not interrupted 
 
 230. See supra Part II.C (describing Mandujano’s holding and arguing that the case 
represented a deviation from common-law attempt doctrines). 
 231. See Keeler v. Superior Court, 470 P.2d 617, 633 (Cal. 1970) (warning against judicial 
encroachment upon the legislature’s role of creating criminal offenses). 
 232. United States v. Hsu, 155 F.3d 189, 202 n.19 (3d Cir. 1998) (“We adopt the Model Penal 
Code (‘MPC’) test . . . .”); United States v. Rovetuso, 768 F.2d 809, 821 (7th Cir. 1985) (applying 
Mandujano’s substantial step test); United States v. Johnson, 767 F.2d 673, 675 (10th Cir. 1985) 
(using the “substantial step” test and applying Mandujano); United States v. McFadden, 739 
F.2d 149, 152 (4th Cir. 1984) (using the “substantial step” test and discussing section 5.01 and 
Mandujano); United States v. Rivera-Sola, 713 F.2d 866, 869 (1st Cir. 1983) (“[F]ederal courts 
have rather uniformly adopted . . . Section 5.01 . . . . We also adopt this standard.”); United 
States v. McDowell, 705 F.2d 426, 427–28 (11th Cir. 1983) (adopting the Mandujano test); 
United States v. Joyce, 693 F.2d 838, 841 (8th Cir. 1982) (“[F]ederal courts have rather 
uniformly adopted the standard set forth in Section 5.01 of the American Law Institute’s Model 
Penal Code . . . .”); United States v. Jackson, 560 F.2d 112, 120 (2d Cir. 1977) (stating that its test 
was “derived in large part from the Model Penal Code’s standard”); United States v. 
Mandujano, 499 F.2d 370, 377 n.6 (5th Cir. 1974) (“Our definition is generally consistent with 
and our language is in fact close to the definitions proposed by the . . . Model Penal Code.”). 
 233. United States v. Oviedo, 525 F.2d 881, 885 (5th Cir. 1976). 
 234. See supra Part I.A.3 (discussing the res ipsa loquitur test). 
 235. AM. LAW INST., supra note 6, at 329–32 (describing how and why the MPC’s test 
differed from the common-law tests). 
 236. LAFAVE, supra note 10, at 627. 
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extraneously” would “result in a crime.”237 This language appears to 
be consistent with the probable desistance approach, as it focuses on 
the likelihood that the defendant would have actually completed his 
crime.238 The Eighth Circuit cited two pre-Mandujano cases in support 
of this rule: one described, in part, a probable desistance approach239 
while the other avoided defining attempts at all and simply reiterated 
that preparation was insufficient to establish an attempt.240 
Courts’ vacillation between the substantial step test and more 
restrictive common-law tests reflects the confusion inherent in 
“adopting” a private source of law like the MPC. That courts do not 
even seem to acknowledge that any confusion exists, or that they are 
referencing two entirely different standards for the same crime, 
reinforces the notion that judges are not expressing disagreement 
over how attempt should be defined. These judges are instead 
grappling with the aftermath of Mandujano and the problems of 
defining offenses according to the MPC. 
C. Renunciation 
In its definition of criminal attempts, section 5.01 includes an 
affirmative defense of renunciation.241 Although courts operating 
under the common law mentioned the concept,242 there was 
traditionally no renunciation defense at common law.243 Under the 
MPC’s definition, a defendant is entitled to the affirmative defense of 
renunciation if “he abandoned his effort to commit the crime or 
otherwise prevented its commission, under circumstances manifesting 
 
 237. Joyce, 693 F.2d at 841–42 (quoting United States v. Monholland, 607 F.2d 1311, 1319 
(10th Cir. 1979)). 
 238. See supra Part I.A.2 (discussing the probable desistance approach). 
 239. Joyce, 693 F.2d at 842 (citing People v. Miller, 42 P.2d 308, 309 (Cal. 1935)). Miller 
required that “[t]here must be some appreciable fragment of the crime committed, and it must 
be in such progress that it will be consummated unless interrupted by circumstances 
independent of the will of the attempter.” Miller, 42 P.2d at 309 (quoting 1 FRANCIS WHARTON, 
WHARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW 280 (12th ed. 1932)). 
 240. Id. (citing Mims v. United States, 375 F.2d 135, 148 n.40 (5th Cir. 1967)). Mims stated 
that “[p]reparation alone is not enough, there must be some appreciable fragment of the crime 
committed.” Mims, 375 F.2d at 148 n.40 (emphasis added) (quoting People v. Buffum, 256 P.2d 
317, 321 (Cal. 1953)).  
 241. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(4) (1962). 
 242. See, e.g., Hamiel v. State, 285 N.W.2d 639, 645 (Wis. 1979) (discussing voluntary 
abandonment of an attempt using a test similar to the res ipsa loquitur test). 
 243. LAFAVE, supra note 10, at 642 (“The traditional view as expressed by most 
commentators is that abandonment is never a defense to a charge of attempt.”). 
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a complete and voluntary renunciation of his criminal purpose.”244 A 
“complete and voluntary” renunciation must satisfy two factors: (1) it 
must “originate with the actor,” and not be brought about by 
circumstances that make the crime more difficult or dangerous to 
commit; and (2) it must be “permanent and complete, rather than 
temporary or contingent.”245  
The Commentaries describe two policy considerations for 
adopting the renunciation defense.246 First is a belief that a “complete 
and voluntary” renunciation tends to indicate that the attempter was 
less dangerous.247 One purpose of the MPC’s requirement that a 
substantial step strongly corroborate criminal intent is to show that 
the actor’s criminal purpose was so serious as to indicate that the 
defendant was dangerous.248 The defense of renunciation gives 
defendants the opportunity to demonstrate that their criminal intent 
lacked the seriousness that warrants criminal punishment.249 Second, 
the Commentaries express a belief that the defense of renunciation 
would encourage would-be criminals to renounce, “diminishing the 
risk that the substantive crime will be committed.”250 
Despite the fact that every federal circuit has held that the 
MPC’s “substantial step” test defines the act requirement,251 no circuit 
has recognized a renunciation defense. The Sixth and Eighth Circuits 
have explicitly rejected it.252 
At one point, it seemed the Eighth Circuit was inclined to 
recognize renunciation. In United States v. Joyce,253 the defendant was 
convicted of, inter alia, one count of attempt to possess cocaine.254 
Michael Dennis Joyce communicated with a drug dealer who was 
actually an undercover police officer.255 The officer told Joyce, located 
 
 244. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(4).  
 245. AM. LAW INST., supra note 6, at 358.  
 246. Id. at 356–62. 
 247. Id. at 359. 
 248. Id. at 331.  
 249. Id. at 359. 
 250. Id.  
 251. See supra note 232 (listing cases).  
 252. United States v. Young, 613 F.3d 735, 745 (8th Cir. 2010) (“We hold today that a 
defendant cannot abandon an attempt once it has been completed.”); United States v. Shelton, 
30 F.3d 702, 706 (6th Cir. 1994) (“We . . . hold that withdrawal, abandonment and renunciation, 
however characterized, do not provide a defense to an attempt crime.”).  
 253. United States v. Joyce, 693 F.2d 838 (8th Cir. 1982). 
 254. Id. at 839.  
 255. Id.  
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in Oklahoma City, that drugs would be available for purchase in St. 
Louis.256 Joyce flew to St. Louis, met an undercover officer posing as a 
cocaine dealer, and asked to be shown the cocaine.257 The officer left 
the room, and returned with a wrapped package, claiming that it 
contained cocaine.258 Joyce refused to produce any money unless the 
officer opened the package, and the officer refused to open the 
package unless Joyce produced his payment.259 Realizing that the two 
had reached an impasse, the officer told Joyce to leave, and Joyce left, 
“with no apparent intention of returning at a later time to purchase 
any cocaine.”260 Joyce was apprehended as he left his meeting with the 
officer, and a search of his luggage revealed $22,000 in cash.261 A jury 
convicted Joyce of attempted possession of cocaine with intent to 
distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846.262 
Surprisingly, the Eighth Circuit reversed Joyce’s conviction, 
holding that he had not taken a “substantial step” toward the 
completion of the crime.263 A defendant who, like Joyce, travels 
interstate with a suitcase full of money, meets with a drug dealer, 
expresses a desire to exchange drugs for money, and holds the 
cocaine he intends to buy in his hands has taken a substantial step 
that is strongly corroborative of his attempt to possess cocaine. Under 
the MPC, it is legally sufficient to establish a substantial step if the 
defendant possesses “materials to be employed in the commission of 
the crime, at or near the place contemplated for its commission, 
where such possession . . . serves no lawful purpose of the actor under 
the circumstances.”264 Joyce possessed $22,000 in cash near the hotel 
room where he intended to use that money to purchase $20,000 worth 
of cocaine.265 Although money by itself could serve a lawful purpose 
under most circumstances, $22,000 in cash could have served no other 
purpose at the hotel. Further, the same rationales that justify 
considering other examples of conduct to be substantial steps justify 
 
 256. Id. at 839–40. 
 257. Id. at 840. 
 258. Id. 
 259. Id. 
 260. Id.  
 261. Id. 
 262. Id. at 839. 
 263. Id. at 841.  
 264. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(2)(f) (1962). 
 265. Joyce, 693 F.2d at 840. 
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finding Joyce’s conduct to be a substantial step.266 Taken as a whole, 
Joyce’s actions are certainly “strongly corroborative” of his intent to 
possess cocaine. 
The court’s reasoning and language are much easier to 
understand under a renunciation analysis.267 The court held that 
although unsuccessful or aborted attempts can support an attempt 
prosecution, Joyce’s case was different because “generally the 
abortion of the attempt occurs because of events beyond the control 
of the attemptor.”268 This reasoning does not speak to any test for 
finding a substantial step; however, it mirrors the requirement of “a 
complete and voluntary renunciation of . . . criminal purpose” for the 
renunciation defense.269 If the court was looking for actions which 
“negative[d]” the defendant’s dangerousness—a consideration for 
renunciation under the MPC—then his eventual refusal to purchase 
the cocaine would have been relevant.270 It would have shown that his 
criminal intent was insufficiently firm to warrant criminal 
punishment. Despite the seeming endorsement of the renunciation 
defense in Joyce, the Eighth Circuit effectively overturned that 
decision in United States v. Young,271 which held that “a defendant 
cannot abandon an attempt once it has been completed.”272 
 
 266. For example, consider section 5.01(2)(a) and (c), which state that “searching for . . . the 
contemplated victim of the crime” and “reconnoitering the place contemplated for the 
commission of the crime” can amount to a substantial step by themselves. MODEL PENAL CODE 
§ 5.01(2)(a), (c). Although there is no specific “victim” of possession of cocaine, Joyce did 
search out the drug dealer and the cocaine he intended to possess. Joyce, 693 F.2d at 839–40. 
Though there is no evidence that Joyce “reconnoiter[ed]” the place where the transaction was 
supposed to occur, he went even further by actually entering the hotel room with the drug 
dealer. Id. at 840. 
 267. See Joyce, 693 F.2d at 841–43 (“Whatever intention Joyce had to procure cocaine was 
abandoned prior to commission of a necessary and substantial step to effectuate the purchase of 
cocaine.”). 
 268. Id. at 841. 
 269. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(4) (emphasis added). 
 270. See AM. LAW INST., supra note 6, at 359 (describing the negation of an actor’s 
dangerousness as a motivating factor behind MPC renunciation).  
 271. United States v. Young, 613 F.3d 735 (8th Cir. 2010). 
 272. Id. at 745. The Eighth Circuit, between the publication of Joyce and Young, decided an 
unusual case on renunciation. In United States v. Ball, 22 F.3d 197 (8th Cir. 1994), the 
defendants were convicted of entering a bank with intent to commit robbery in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 2113(a). Id. at 198. The defendants argued that the jury should have been instructed on 
a renunciation defense, because after the defendants entered the bank with intent to commit a 
robbery, they “abandoned or withdrew . . . when they left the bank without pointing a gun or 
announcing a stick-up.” Id. at 199. The court held that the renunciation defense has no 
application except to attempt crimes. Id. A statute criminalizing the act of entering a bank with 
intent to commit a robbery covers similar ground as a statute criminalizing an attempted bank 
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The two cases that explicitly rejected the renunciation defense, 
Young and United States v. Shelton,273 employed similar reasoning.274 
The two courts did not ask whether the word “attempt” as used in the 
statute carried with it an affirmative defense of renunciation. Rather, 
both courts indicated that the defense of renunciation275 was logically 
impossible. According to both courts, “the attempt crime is complete 
with proof of intent together with . . . a substantial step” after which a 
defendant “can withdraw only from the commission of the 
substantive offense” and not the attempt.276 
That a crime has been “completed” does not logically preclude 
the possibility of an affirmative defense. Indeed, the legal question of 
an affirmative defense is only relevant if the prosecution can show 
that the defendant met all other elements of the crime. Criminal 
sanctions can attach in whatever circumstances the law dictates, and 
the renunciation defense merely excludes some circumstances from 
the reach of attempt law.277 There is no requirement, logical or legal, 
that criminal sanctions be imposed regardless of what the defendant 
does after satisfying the elements of a crime. Whatever policy reasons 
there may be for rejecting the defense of renunciation, the defense 
should not be rejected on a mistaken belief that the defense could not 
logically exist. 
Should courts adopt the renunciation defense? As long as the 
courts persist in defining attempts according to the MPC, the answer 
is “yes.” As an intuitive matter, it seems unfair to defendants that 
courts would expand criminal liability for attempt by adopting section 
5.01(1), (2), and (3) from the MPC, but refuse to narrow the scope of 
that liability through the affirmative defense in section 5.01(4). As 
Justice Felix Frankfurter said, “if a word is obviously transplanted 
from another legal source, whether the common law or other 
 
robbery, and is probably based upon similar policy considerations. However, by moving beyond 
a simple “attempt” statute and prohibiting specific conduct, Congress demonstrated an intent to 
remove questions of the sufficiency of the act or of renunciation from this particular type of 
attempt. 
 273. United States v. Shelton, 30 F.3d 702 (6th Cir. 1994).  
 274. See Young, 613 F.3d at 745–46 (quoting extensively from Shelton). 
 275. The renunciation defense was characterized as “withdrawal” from the attempt in 
Shelton, 30 F.3d at 705, and as “abandonment” of the attempt in Young, 613 F.3d at 743–44.  
 276. Young, 613 F.3d at 745 (quoting Shelton, 30 F.3d at 706).  
 277. For further discussion of the logical underpinnings of the renunciation defense and of 
the policy arguments in favor of adopting the defense, see Hoeber, supra note 219, at 383–403.  
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legislation, it brings the old soil with it.”278 The Code’s drafters 
believed that there is significantly less justification for imposing 
criminal sanctions upon a defendant who takes a “substantial step” 
but renounces that attempt, and codified that belief by including a 
renunciation defense.279 By refusing to recognize the defense of 
renunciation, federal courts have stripped the substantial step test of 
a significant piece of its “soil.” 
The concerns that weigh against a federal court adopting the 
MPC’s substantial step test do not apply in the case of the 
renunciation defense. Affirmative defenses are traditionally created 
through judicial decisions, and many are still defined solely by the 
common law.280 Although the background of adopting the MPC is 
itself problematic, there is no corresponding reason for courts to 
refuse to adopt the Code’s renunciation defense. 
There is no clear legal doctrine governing how courts should 
adopt rules from the MPC. This should not be an invitation for courts 
to cherry-pick parts of ideas from private sources like the MPC at 
will. In fact, many courts have indicated in dicta that they intended to 
adopt section 5.01 in its entirety, not that they intended to adopt 
section 5.01(1), (2), and (3), but not (4).281 The problem of 
renunciation typifies the confusion caused by deviating from the 
normal practice of interpreting common-law language according to 
common-law definitions absent clear legislative instructions to the 
contrary. Affording defendants the renunciation defense may be the 
most fair choice once the substantial step test has already been 
adopted because it applies the provisions of section 5.01 that help 
defendants as well as those that help prosecutors. However, these 
problems only exist because courts have improperly interpreted 
attempt statutes, and the proper course of action should be to revert 
to a common-law test, rather than simply “completing” the error by 
adopting section 5.01 in its entirety. 
 
 278. Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 
537 (1947). 
 279. AM. LAW INST., supra note 6, at 356–62. 
 280. See, e.g., United States v. Peterson, 483 F.2d 1222, 1230–38 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (discussing 
the common-law “body of doctrine” defining federal self-defense law).  
 281. E.g., United States v. Hsu, 155 F.3d 189, 202 n.19 (3d Cir. 1998) (“We adopt the Model 
Penal Code (“MPC”) test for attempt . . . .”); United States v. Rivera-Sola, 713 F.2d 866, 869 
(1st Cir. 1983) (adopting “the standard found in Section 5.01” of the MPC). 
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CONCLUSION 
Perhaps the most surprising aspect of the federal courts’ 
universal adoption of the MPC’s definition of attempt after 
Mandujano is that no court appears to have seriously considered any 
other path.282 The absence of judicial opinions or scholarly literature 
on this point indicates that few lawyers may be aware that Mandujano 
and its progeny could be challenged based on the arguments set forth 
here. Defense lawyers should be aware that they could plausibly 
argue their clients should benefit from of a more lenient legal 
standard.283 But defense lawyers can only be successful if federal 
appellate courts are willing to remedy the now-entrenched mistake of 
“adopting” the MPC into the federal law. Courts must be willing to 
view their role as the one stated by Judge Kozinski: “[W]e are not 
common law judges; we are judges in an age of statutes. For us, justice 
consists of applying the laws passed by the legislature, precisely as 
written by the legislature. Unlike common law judges, we have no 
power to bend the law to satisfy our own sense of right and wrong.”284 
 
 
 282. Research has uncovered only one instance in which a federal circuit court addressed 
whether the MPC’s formulation was properly adopted: United States v. Dworken, 855 F.2d 12 
(1st Cir. 1988). In Dworken, the court noted that counsel for the defendant only raised the issue 
at oral argument, and therefore that it need not have been considered, “especially where, as 
here, the issue is one that demands extensive briefing and argument.” Id. at 17 n.2. 
 283. Although this Note has primarily discussed appellate cases, trial attorneys should be 
aware of this issue so that it may be preserved for appeal. If a defendant does not object to a 
trial court’s jury instruction, the appellate court can review only for plain error. See FED. R. 
CRIM. P. 30(d), 52(b). A defendant would have difficulty arguing that the trial court’s error was 
“plain” when it was consistent with the current precedent of every circuit.  
 284. Kozinski, supra note 227, at 1877.  
